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1. THE LCROSS MISSION PROPOSAL 
 
Early in 2006, the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) held a competition for 
NASA Centers to propose innovative ideas for a secondary payload mission to launch with the 
Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) to the Moon. The successful proposal could cost no more 
than $80 million dollars (less was preferred), would have to be ready to launch with the LRO in 31 
months, could weigh no more than 1000 kg (fuelled), and would be designated a risk-tolerant 
“Class D” mission. In effect, NASA was offering a fixed-price contract to the winning NASA team 
to stay within a cost and schedule cap by accepting an unusually elevated risk position. 
 
To address this Announcement of Opportunity to develop a cost-and-schedule-capped secondary 
payload mission to fly with LRO, NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) in Moffett Field, CA, USA 
embarked on a brainstorming effort termed “Blue Ice” in which a small team was asked to explore a 
number of mission scenarios that might have a good chance for success and still fit within the stated 
programmatic constraints. From this work, ARC developed and submitted six of the nineteen 
mission proposals received by ESMD from throughout the Agency, one of which was LCROSS - a 
collaborative effort between ARC and its industrial partner, Northrop-Grumman (NG) in Redondo 
Beach, CA, USA.  
 
In the LCROSS proposal, ARC would manage the mission, perform systems engineering and 
mission design (teaming with NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL)), conduct mission and science operations, and design/develop the payload 
instrument suite while NG would design and build the innovative spacecraft bus. 
 
If successful, the LCROSS mission (Fig.1) would conduct the first in-situ study of a pristine, 
permanently shadowed lunar crater and would: 
 
• Confirm the presence of water ice in a permanently shadowed region 
• Determine the nature of hydrogen signatures detected at the lunar poles on the previous 
lunar missions, Clementine and Lunar Prospector  
• Determine the amount of water, if present, in the lunar regolith or soil 
• Determine the composition of the lunar regolith 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100028203 2019-08-30T11:00:46+00:00Z
Fig. 1. The LCROSS spacecraft 
 
2. THE LCROSS SELECTION 
 
After a period of evaluation by ESMD and the Robotic Lunar Exploration Program (RLEP), 
LCROSS was selected in a somewhat dramatic “reveal” in Washington DC shortly before it was 
announced at a NASA press conference. Just prior to the television cameras going live, ESMD 
Associate Administrator (AA) Scott “Doc” Horowitz informed LCROSS Project Manager Dan 
Andrews that ESMD had a very focused purpose for LCROSS because it represented a type of 
mission that “is not your father’s NASA”. Horowitz acknowledged that there was a place for the 
heft and conservatism of traditional NASA missions, primarily in manned-spaceflight, but that the 
Agency also needed a way to accomplish tactical missions inexpensively, given the financial 
constraints facing future Agency budgets. In LCROSS, he saw an exciting mission, able to inspire 
the public by determining if water-ice is present on the Moon, while at the same time proving there 
is a cost-effective way to execute meaningful missions on a budget.  
 
After the press conference, Horowitz and Andrews discussed how LCROSS could be a pathfinder 
project for the Agency’s ability to make practical use of excess launch capacity, while staying 
within tough cost & schedule constraints. Noting that the Agency would increasingly need to rely 
on smaller, high-leverage, cost-capped missions, Horowitz asked Andrews to track all that he 
learned over the next 31 months in bringing LCROSS to a successful conclusion. This would 
include how well the NASA Policy Requirements (NPRs) served the project, the effectiveness of 
acquisition processes, and how the Program Office and Headquarters behaved with this 
unconventional project. Using the LCROSS mission as a prototype, Horowitz had a clear vision of 
how and where this type of mission would fit within the NASA portfolio. As he later stated in an 
interview, “I could triple the cost to try and guarantee no failure, or I could do three projects and 
even if one fails, I still get more done” [1]. 
 
This key dialogue with the principal mission stakeholder established the context for what would 
make a successful LCROSS mission, i.e., cost and schedule were key drivers and risks could be 
taken.   
 
3. THE LCROSS SCIENCE MISSION 
 
The scientific basis for the LCROSS mission had roots in the Clementine (1994) and Lunar 
Prospector (1998) Missions which performed complementary forms of resource mapping. This 
mapping led the lunar science community to conclude that there might be water-ice trapped in 
permanently-shadowed craters on the Moon. 
 
The Clementine Mission [2] was launched in 1994 from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California 
aboard a Titan IIG rocket. It was a joint project between the Strategic Defence Initiative 
Organization in Washington and NASA, with the objective of making scientific observations of the 
Moon, assessing the surface mineralogy, and obtaining lunar altimetry or imagery from a fixed 
altitude. 
 
The Lunar Prospector Mission [2] was launched in 1998 aboard a Lockheed Martin solid-fuel, 
three-stage Athena II rocket. The Lunar Prospector Mission was the third selected by NASA for the 
Discovery Program. Lunar Prospector was managed out of NASA ARC, with Lockheed Martin as 
the prime contractor. The 19-month mission was designed for a low polar orbit investigation of the 
Moon, including mapping of surface composition and possible polar ice deposits, completely 
covering the lunar surface twice a month. Originally, the mission was to have simply ended with the 
spacecraft inevitably crashing into the lunar surface once it expended all its fuel. As the mission 
neared its end, however, the suggestion was made to use the crash as part of an experiment to 
confirm the existence of water on the Moon. The spacecraft was successfully directed into a crater 
near the lunar South Pole, but the impact plume was not significant, probably due to a poor impact 
angle and low spacecraft mass. 
 
Both of these missions were instrumental in the lunar ice question. In particular, the Lunar 
Prospector Mission (LP) neutron measurements indicated elevated hydrogen signatures in 
permanently-shadowed craters on both the North and South poles of the Moon. In light of these 
data, the science community wondered if these elevated hydrogen signatures could be an indication 
of the presence of water-ice, trapped just beneath the regolith surface of the crater floors.  
 
If water does exist on the Moon, it could have arrived the same way water did on Earth - through 
billions of years of bombardment by meteors and comets. However, because the Moon’s gravity is 
less than one fifth of Earth’s gravity, the Moon retains practically no atmosphere and any deposition 
on the moon's surface would be subject to direct exposure to both the vacuum of space and daylight 
temperatures that reach up to 250° Fahrenheit. In the North and South polar regions, however, the 
sun never rises above certain crater rims so sunlight never reaches the crater floor. With 
temperatures estimated to be near -328° Fahrenheit (-200° C), these craters can 'cold trap' or capture 
most volatiles, such as water. 
 
Given the expense of bringing water from Earth to the surface of the moon (from $15K to $50K for 
the equivalent of a ½ litre bottle), finding water-ice in sufficient quantities in these permanently 
shadowed craters could result in a compelling rationale for locating lunar outposts in the vicinity of 
this valuable resource. An in-situ resource like water that could be converted to consumable water, 
breathable oxygen, rocket fuel, and potentially even used as a means for construction when 
combined with regolith, or as a shielding means from solar radiation, would make inhabitation and 
exploration of the Moon a much more achievable future reality.  
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4. THE LCROSS MISSION  
 
LCROSS proposed to conduct a low-cost, fast-track companion mission to launch with LRO. The 
Atlas launch vehicle used for the LRO mission consists of a booster stage and the Centaur upper 
stage. The LCROSS spacecraft would be mounted atop the Centaur with the LRO spacecraft 
mounted atop LCROSS (Fig. 2).  
Fig. 2. The LRO/LCROSS launch vehicle stack 
 
With a mass constraint of 1000 Kg, LCROSS proposed to use the upper stage of the Atlas-V rocket 
(the “Centaur”), normally space junk after delivering a payload, to effectively triple the size of its 
working payload. By repurposing the spent Centaur to LCROSS, mission planners were able to stay 
within the 1000 Kg mass budget allotted to the secondary payload while gaining approximately 
2300 Kg of mass “for free”. 
 
Proposing the use the Centaur as a lunar kinetic impactor, LCROSS would “drop” the 2300 Kg 
rocket (about the weight of a large sports utility vehicle) into a permanently-shadowed crater, at a 
speed of 1.5 miles/second (2.5 km/s) or three times the speed of a bullet, to kick-up a plume of 
material from the crater floor. The 1000 Kg LCROSS “Shepherding Spacecraft” would then collect 
and transmit data about the impact and plume back to LCROSS mission control using nine on-
board science instruments before impacting the surface itself, about 4 minutes after the Centaur. 
 
On June 18, 2009, LCROSS and LRO launched aboard an Atlas V rocket from Cape Canaveral, in 
Florida, USA. Once the Atlas V achieved the LRO lunar insertion requirement, LRO separated, 
enabling it to independently move forward on its mission, leaving LCROSS and the still-attached 
Centaur behind. The Centaur then performed a series of venting maneuvers to eliminate gasses 
which could contaminate the lunar impact measurement. The Centaur then became an inert, empty 
vessel and an official part of the LCROSS mission. Approximately five days after launch, LCROSS 
entered into an extended Lunar Gravity-Assist, Lunar Return Orbit (LGALRO) by performing a 
lunar-swing-by of the moon. The cruise phase of the mission lasted slightly more than 100 days 
before entering into the terminal phase of the mission. In the meantime, LCROSS’ long, high-
inclination orbit around the Earth gave the LRO mission time to commission its instruments and 
collect data about the South Pole craters to help the LCROSS science team refine target crater 
selection. In fact, this LRO data led to LCROSS changing the impact crater from Cabeus-A to 
Cabeus. Cabeus had more relevant conditions related to the fundamental water question, but was a 
much deeper crater. We knew this crater change would be to the detriment of Earth observations, 
but it was the scientifically proper strategy for the mission. The LCROSS PM and science team’s 
first priority was to assure scientific relevance. 
 
During cruise phase, LCROSS maintained its Earth cruise orbit by executing several Trajectory 
Correction Maneuvers (TCMs) to provide for the final lunar approach required to position the 
Centaur for its ballistic lunar impact. Following the final TCM, the Centaur and the Shepherding 
Spacecraft separated about nine hours before impact (Fig. 3) followed by the Shepherding  
Fig. 3 & 4. Illustration of LCROSS after separation and after Impact 
 
 
Spacecraft performing a braking maneuver to enable the released Centaur to impact the Moon first. 
This delay provided time for the Shepherding spacecraft to observe the ejecta plume arising from 
the Centaur impact. The Centaur’s impact is estimated to have excavated 250-350 metric tons of 
regolith, leaving an impact crater approximately 82 feet (25 m) in diameter (Fig. 4). LCROSS 
discovered that regolith in this permanently-shadowed crater was very fine with a talc-like 
consistency. Much of the kinetic energy of the Centaur impact was converted into thermal energy 
into the local soil creating a notable vapor cloud. Less energy went into rock and dirt ejecta being 
thrown upward given the nature of the crater floor regolith. As the Shepherding Spacecraft 
continued its delayed decent, cameras and sensors in the instrument suite were able to measure the 
constituents of the Centaur ejecta plume, observing and measuring all the way down to the 
inevitable impact on the Moon four minutes later. The sensors on LRO were able to make notable 
measurements of the nature of the ejecta and impact plume, providing excellent complementary 
data on the LCROSS impact. 
 
5. THE LCROSS PAYLOAD INSTRUMENTS 
 
The LCROSS instrument payload was designed to provide mission scientists with multiple 
complimentary views of the debris plume created by the Centaur impact. The instrument suite 
consisted of nine instruments: one visible, two near-infrared and two mid-infrared cameras; one 
visible and two near-infrared spectrometers; and a photometer, all optimized to answer the 
fundamental question about water ice. 
 
LCROSS Science 
As the impact debris plume rises above the target crater’s rim, it is exposed to sunlight and any 
water-ice, hydrocarbons or organics are vaporized and break down into their basic components. 
These components are primarily monitored by the visible and infrared spectrometers. The near-
infrared and mid-infrared cameras determine the total amount and distribution of water in the debris 
plume. The spacecraft’s visible camera tracks the impact location and the behaviour of the debris 
plume while the visible photometer measures the flash created by the Centaur impact. Finally, to 
gather all this instrument data together LCROSS employs a Data Handling Unit (DHU) for 
transmission back to LCROSS Mission Control.  
 
These instruments were selected to be low-cost, rugged, commercially available components…. for 
an Earth environment. However, to ensure survival in both space and launch environments, the 
LCROSS payload team needed to put the individual instruments though rigorous testing to simulate 
launch and the conditions in space. When that testing revealed weaknesses, the team worked with 
the manufacturers to strengthen their designs for satisfactory use in the LCROSS mission. 
 
6. NASA CLASS D MISSIONS 
 
A key enabling factor for LCROSS success was its designation by the ESMD Associate 
Administrator as a risk-tolerant Class D mission. NASA classifies all spaceflight missions into one 
of four categories based on risk tolerance: Class A, B, C, and D. This classification system has 
origins in the Department of Defense (DoD) Military Standards (Mil-STDS) documents which 
NASA has tailored into a Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) NASA Procedural Requirement 
(NPR 8705.4) [3]. 
 
Class A missions, at the risk intolerant end of the spectrum, tend to be large, expensive missions, 
and/or manned spaceflight missions where human lives are put in harm’s way. Class A missions are 
typically formulated with generous technical margins, schedule slack and reserve dollars to address 
the need for redundant systems and extensive testing to assure requirements satisfaction with 
reliability – all of which lead to elevated cost. 
 
Class D missions, at the other end of the risk spectrum, are the most risk-tolerant missions in 
NASA. While safety concerns are treated no differently for a Class D mission than a Class A 
mission, Class D missions are allowed to be “single strung”, which means there is no redundancy 
required. In fact, as it states in NPR 8705.4, “Medium or significant risk of not achieving mission 
success is permitted”, so this type of mission can fail. Class D designation is typically applied to 
small missions that are constrained in some way making it harder to assure mission success. For 
LCROSS, the Agency Class D designation was in place to improve the likelihood it could make the 
LRO launch date, within budget. 
 
7. LCROSS AS A CLASS D MISSION 
 
When LCROSS was cast as a Class D mission, technical risk officially became part of the mission 
trade space. Because the mission was cost-capped, cost maintenance was essential. The Project cost 
cap had to be maintained even if at the expense of technical requirements as the mission could be 
cancelled if the cost cap was exceeded. LCROSS was also schedule-constrained since it had to 
make the LRO launch date. As a result, LCROSS was permitted to waive performance requirements 
or take additional risk as necessary to fit into the schedule and cost constraints.  
 
The Program Office handled the Level 2 (L2) requirements levied on the LCROSS Project in a 
similar vein, establishing “Minimum” and “Full Success Criteria” to set priorities if requirements 
trades had to be made. The L2 requirements document specifically listed, by number, the 
requirements which were Minimum Success criteria, leaving the rest to be Full Success criteria and 
able to be traded if required. This document effectively told LCROSS Project Management, “if you 
are forced to start dumping some of your requirements, here’s how we’d like you to prioritize 
them”. Achieving concurrence up-front on acceptable ways to make contingency trades saved time 
and heartache as the mission progressed. 
 
Class D Challenges 
As a Class D mission, LCROSS quickly discovered that although the designation was adequately 
defined in the cited NPR, there was little or no reference to this risk classification in other NASA 
policy documents. Further, approaches that the LCROSS team had the latitude to execute, may not 
have been permitted by other NPRs, effectively driving the mission class higher. As pioneers for 
the Class D mission designation, LCROSS Project Management soon found that internal 
contradictions and discontinuities between policy documents were their problems to resolve. 
 
Another issue associated with the Class D risk designation was its extensibility to the spacecraft 
contractor, Northrop-Grumman. The NASA Class D designation established a performance 
standard for the execution of the Project, but it was not necessarily in alignment with how the 
spacecraft contractor could operate within their own corporate constraints. The NG part of the 
LCROSS team started the process of finding their own equivalent of a Class D approach within 
their existing, approved corporate processes. Although they were able to find an existing approach 
that streamlined oversight and approval processes to helped them to come into Class D alignment, it 
required them to address two important issues: 1) Is a corporate entity willing/able to take the same 
risks of failure defined by the NASA Class D mission designation and 2) Does this work within 
their own framework of shareholders? In the end, the answers were the same for NG and ARC. 
Neither organization came together to manage the LCROSS Project just to see it fail, regardless of 
mission class. So the LCROSS team had to find ways to keep risk in check while staying within the 
cost and schedule caps. 
 
One of the burdens being a pathfinder for the Class D mission construct was the need to advocate 
for new approaches with stakeholders. For NASA stakeholders, LCROSS advocated for approaches 
that involved tailoring existing policies rather than waiving policies altogether. This approach 
avoided time-consuming resistance to waiving which leads to stakeholder questions such as, “This 
procedural requirement is in place because past experience shows that this requirement is a wise 
thing to do… so justify why you do not feel it is wise for your project”? For NG corporate 
stakeholders, both tailoring and waiving existing processes had to be employed to gain acceptance, 
particularly from NG mission assurance organizations. In fact, the NG Project Manager for 
LCROSS once said, “We had to create a waiver to the waiver process”, since he had to overcome 
the same difficulties as the ARC Project Manager did with NASA stakeholders. 
 
Finally, there was the challenge of integrating the Class D LCROSS mission with the Class B/C 
LRO and the Class A Atlas launch vehicle. In the end, the lowest common denominator, i.e., least 
risk-tolerant approach, prevailed, which was counter to the LCROSS context. For example, in the 
case of structural margins, LCROSS had done some analysis calculations which showed generous 
margins on natural frequencies of the propulsion tank and the secondary structure. Atlas and LRO 
concurred that the computed frequencies were good numbers, but wanted additional verification of 
those numbers which were based only on analysis. Because this level of additional verification was 
in alignment with the mission risk position for LRO, LCROSS was forced to conduct testing on the 
structure and propellant tank to verify the analysis. Because the monies expended to satisfy another 
mission’s risk position exceeded the LCROSS cost cap, Project Management successfully 
advocated for the Program Office to pay for the cost of enhanced LCROSS testing. 
 
8. MANAGING THE LCROSS RISK EQUATION  
 
Managing the mission success risk equation for LCROSS involved management of the three 
traditional elements – cost, schedule, and technical capabilities. Because cost and schedule were 
constrained, technical capability was really the only knob that could be turned/managed.  
 
Cost Risk + Schedule Risk + Technical Risk = Mission Risk   
 
Although LCROSS had Class D mission designation allowing a higher-than-normal mission risk, it 
was in everyone’s interest to keep that risk as low as possible to increase the chances of success. By 
definition then, the technical capability risk also had to be kept as low as possible, primarily by 
keeping the complexity level as low as possible.  
 
Lowering Complexity Lowers Risk 
If a system is designed to be low in complexity, extra margin is effectively added to the technical 
risk element – margin that can be traded if developmental difficulties are encountered later on in the 
project. For example, if procurement is taking longer than planned, thereby increasing schedule risk 
in this schedule-capped mission, that risk can be reduced by reducing the unit-level testing that was 
originally planned. While not testing at a unit level runs the risk of problems not emerging until 
box-level testing occurs, if the system is of low-complexity, the risk of that occurring might be 
worth the trade. If that unit-level device has been proven on a previous mission and is being re-used 
in the same way as on that previous mission, the risk may be small. If the card in which testing is 
reduced is easily removed/replaced from the avionics box, making a later discovery of a problem 
would not represent a large problem and thus, may be worth the trade. Alternatively, you might 
continue with all the unit and subsystem level testing, but reduce the degree of integrated systems 
testing to a minimum to recover schedule. Judgment is required to make these trades, and there is 
technical risk. The key is to find ways to keep that risk in check, even in a risk-tolerant 
environment. 
 
Capabilities-Driven Missions Lower Risk 
Keeping that technical risk in check meant the LCROSS mission was not about pushing the limits 
of technology and performance. This particular mission was about doing as much as possible within 
existing capabilities of the system. “We want it all, but we know we need appetite suppressants” 
[4]. Capability-driven missions like LCROSS are exactly what the name implies: working to 
achieve requirements by staying as much as possible within the capabilities of the system. This is 
very different than many science-driven NASA missions where needed capabilities are defined and 
then efforts to meet them are defined to meet the mission requirements. That approach is too open-
ended, and can involve a full development and test cycle which is fraught with risk and can be 
costly in schedule consumption. LCROSS was a Design-to-Cost [5] project, working within cost 
and schedule constraints that were the principal drivers for the project. By working as much as 
possible with existing designs, LCROSS had a set of proven capabilities that helped to contain cost 
and schedule. 
 
The perfect incarnation of a capability-driven project requires little to no modifications over what 
has been done before. Everything is not only flight-proven, but proven in the identical arrangement 
and configuration of how it will be used on the project. Clearly, this scenario is not typical, so a real 
Design-to-Cost project needs to carry sufficient risk margins for not only the unknowns, but for the 
inevitable effort required to address the risk associated with expanding capabilities where required. 
Of course, requirements-descope is always an option as it effectively designs in technical risk 
margin to accommodate more mass or power needs as the project evolves. 
 
“Glue Missions” Lower Risk 
By using and “gluing together” already-proven hardware, software, and proven Integration & Test 
(I&T) approaches, the residual technical risk for LCROSS resided primarily in the design effort of 
“gluing” the components together, as well as general component workmanship issues (which are 
always present). In addition to lowering technical risk, “Glue Missions” also tend to keep cost and 
schedule risk in check because the simplicity and heritage extensibility makes it less likely extra 
time and money will be needed to remediate a problem.  
 
Payload Glue: 
LCROSS was conceived using Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) instruments from various 
vendors best suited to meet the mission needs. When COTS instruments are used, however, the 
issue of getting all the instruments to successfully communicate with the spacecraft avionics 
inevitably arises. The visible camera vendor for the LCROSS payload had an interface unit which 
enabled a number of their cameras to be connected to a single interface point, and was a standard 
product. If the cameras and instruments from other vendors could be configured to interface with 
this unit as well, LCROSS could avoid the risk of developing custom, flight-ready blackbox 
solutions for each instrument, thereby saving both development effort and risk. In the end, the other 
instrument vendors were able to deploy an RS-422 interface option that enabled their units to work 
with the visible camera vendor’s single-point data handling unit. Once the instruments were “glued” 
to the data handling unit through the use of a common RS-422 data format, the data handler was 
“glued” to the spacecraft avionics through the use of another standard data protocol – again saving 
untold hours in development and in-flight suitability testing and overall risk reduced.   
 
Spacecraft Glue:  
In science-driven missions, the development of a spacecraft bus frequently involves a custom 
design tailored to the particular needs of the mission – a labor-intensive effort that also requires 
costly verification for flight suitability. In the capabilities-driven LCROSS mission, an existing, 
proven piece of hardware called an ESPA (Evolvable Secondary Payload Adaptor) (Fig. 4) ring, 
which was already designed for flight on the launch vehicle, was chosen to be the basis of the 
LCROSS spacecraft bus. Originally designed to carry multiple secondary payloads at six circular 
ports around the perimeter of the ring while simultaneously supporting the loads from a primary 
payload mounted on top, the ESPA ring’s purpose was to make use of excess launch capability for 
multiple secondary payloads. LCROSS, however, was the first to use this standardized capability to 
develop the backbone of a spacecraft, using the ports to mount various elements of a single 
spacecraft. One port supported the solar array; another port supported the battery panel; another port 
supported the payload instruments, etc. (Fig. 5). 
Figs. 4 & 5. The LCROSS ESPA ring and secondary panels 
 
The standardized ESPA hardware provided the “glue” to connect the primary and secondary 
mission payloads together without the need for costly customized systems or components. As an 
added bonus, using the ESPA ring resulted in a more resilient assembly process for LCROSS as 
each of the panels could be worked-on independently. 
 
Mission Operations Glue: 
Traditional spacecraft control rooms are expensive operations, filling large rooms with wall-to-wall 
people and monitor screens. To stay under the cost cap, LCROSS had to find a different approach, 
so a humble control room with a series of personal computers was set up and “glued” together over 
a local secure network (Fig. 6). Not flashy, but fully functional, the LCROSS Ground Data System 
(GDS) ran the same software that was used during Integration & Test to leverage training and 
investments made earlier in the project, and to again keep technical risk in check. 
Fig. 6. LCROSS Mission Operations control room 
 
9. MANAGING LCROSS REQUIREMENTS  
 
Given the LCROSS mission success equation with its cost-and-schedule constraints, managing 
technical capabilities in the form of project requirements became even more important. LCROSS 
project requirements defined the critical performance metrics of the mission, as well as the 
previously mentioned success criteria. Although the LCROSS minimum success criteria required no 
performance from the payload at all, the spacecraft pointing performance was still required to meet 
the minimum mission success requirements of directing the Centaur into the chosen crater, so those 
requirements were primary. Secondary requirements were those that would achieve Full Mission 
Success for LCROSS. These secondary requirements necessarily involved the payload instruments 
because Full Success Criteria required the LCROSS spacecraft to perform in-situ measurements 
determining the presence and quantity of water-ice. Tertiary requirements, then, were those that 
would be interesting to have, but not required for achieving primary or secondary success criteria. 
 
Thus, the LCROSS mission requirements could be categorized as follows: 
• Minimum (primary) Success Requirements - needed to assure the impactor is sent into a 
targeted, permanently shadowed crater. 
• Full (secondary) Success Requirements - needed to assure the impactor is sent into a 
targeted, permanently shadowed crater, and the LCROSS spacecraft is able to make in-situ 
water-ice measurements of the ejecta plume.  
• Extended Full (tertiary) Success Requirements – needed to assure the impactor is sent into a 
targeted, permanently shadowed crater, and the LCROSS spacecraft is able to make in-situ 
water-ice measurements of the ejecta plume and make other interesting measurements 
related to the ejecta plume. 
 
By prioritizing requirements in this manner, requirements could be cut from the third category, and 
possibly the second without endangering mission success, should the need arise. For example, if it 
were determined that the LCROSS Shepherding Spacecraft could not be separated from the Centaur 
on orbit, all requirements from the second and third categories would be eliminated because the 
payload instruments would become part of the Centaur impact. However, the mission would still be 
considered a success even if the entire stack was crashed into the Moon, as long as the Minimum 
Success Requirements were met and impact took place in a targeted, permanently shadowed crater.  
 
10. MANAGING CAPABILITIES-DRIVEN MISSIONS 
 
With the list of mission requirements clearly prioritized, LCROSS implemented the previously 
discussed Design-to-Cost process using existing capabilities. COTS instruments were sought for 
payloads. Although flight-proven instruments were preferred (the visible camera was flight-
proven), well-established instruments from the commercial or industrial world that were already 
ruggedized to improve the feasibility of use in a space and launch environment were accepted. 
Those instruments were subsequently tested in relevant environments (vacuum, temperature 
extremes, vibration, etc.) to see if the units could withstand anticipated mission conditions. 
Instrument vendors, interested in opening new markets for their products and happy that such 
rigorous use-testing was being funded by the government, were cooperative in upgrading their 
products when issues were discovered. For example, one instrument failed because a screw came 
loose during vibrational testing. It was discovered that no adhesive had been applied to the screw 
threads to help secure the screws in a dynamic load environment. Once adhesive was applied, the 
device passed testing and was accepted for use. In another case, a cable came loose inside an 
instrument because the cable was not staked-down to help reduce the length of unsupported cable 
experiencing the loads of a launch environment. This, too, was easily remedied. 
 
The final suite of LCROSS instruments included a thermal camera (MID-IR1) used in motorsports 
applications, Near-IR spectrometers (NSP1 & NSP2) used in beer-making and carpet fiber analysis 
for assessing recyclability, UV visible spectrometers (UVS) used in standard bench-top laboratory 
equipment, a visible camera routinely used in shuttle launch imagery, and Near-IR cameras (NIR-
cam) used in fiber optic communications applications. All of these were existing hardware that was 
repurposed for the LCROSS space mission. 
 
To employ existing capabilities for the LCROSS spacecraft, well-proven, flight-demonstrated 
hardware was chosen, some of which was even re-purposed. The best example of this was the 
previously described ESPA ring, originally designed to mount between a launch vehicle and 
spacecraft it is carrying, but used by LCROSS as a spacecraft structure. Avionics, batteries, 
propellant tank, thrusters, transponder, and other equipment - all proven on other missions – 
reduced the risk/uncertainty of performance on LCROSS. Along with proven capabilities came 
bounded cost. By using existing hardware, cost risk remained in check. When existing designs are 
altered, development risk - and the cost for covering that risk - increases. 
 
By employing capabilities-driven management, LCROSS adhered to the Design-to-Cost process 
and was able to meet all cost, schedule, and technical capability mission requirements.  
 
11. DESIGNING-TO-COST USING RESERVE MANAGEMENT 
 
If design risk can be combated by applying quantified “reserves”, then assessing a design’s heritage 
is critical in understanding how the reserve position should look. [5] 
 
• Existing designs: 5-15% reserve. This choice covers the residual risk associated with any 
particular instantiation of the design. It may be used exactly as it was in another application, 
but it is still is a new application.  
• Modified designs: 15-50% reserve. This choice accepts that the design is charting new 
territory. While the basis for the design may be proven, uncertainty and new risk is being 
introduced with modification. 
• New designs: 50%-100% reserve. This choice the most difficult to assess because there is 
little to no basis for the design. It is largely a new construct, and depending how complex 
the system, could be carrying moderate to significant cost and schedule risk. 
 
The LCROSS Project, at selection, carried a starting reserve position of ~15%, which is small by 
NASA metrics, but well-aligned with the “existing design” category – an approach LCROSS 
wholeheartedly adopted. By choosing this risk reserve category, the LCROSS team understood that 
tackling a new design would be an unacceptably risky venture.  
 
It is important to note, however, that while the project is carrying reserves to address risk, it is not 
there to support requirements creep or design enhancement. Risk reserves exist to address 
unknowns in the risk position so unanticipated risks that emerge during the project can be 
accommodated without adversely affecting either cost or schedule.  
 
Mission risk reserve can be monitored throughout the project by determining the “Cost-to-Go” 
(CTG) at any given time. The CTG is the amount of reserve remaining compared with anticipated 
reserve expenditure. There are many different standards to manage to, but 10% - 30% were the 
thresholds LCROSS employed to strike a good balance between financial concern and reserve 
expenditure opportunity. The strength of using a CTG metric for making decisions is that it is 
derivate, so problems can be anticipated in time to change a risk position.  
 
LCROSS grew its CTG reserves position in the first half of the project lifecycle by refraining from 
dipping into the reserves which automatically makes the CTG reserve position grow over time. 
When the CTG exceeded 30%, additional activities that would buy-down risk somewhere were 
considered, such as performing additional spacecraft testing, but only as the schedule margin 
position would allow. Near the end of the project, the CTG was allowed to hover in the teens 
because a fair amount of risk had been retired by then getting through spacecraft Integration and 
Testing (I&T), but was never allowed to drop below 10% until the endpoint was in sight. The 
history of LCROSS CTG management can be seen in Fig 7. 
Fig. 7. LCROSS Cost-To-Go chart 
 
At the end of a project where the remaining work is getting small and the reserves position is also 
getting small, the CTG calculation becomes less useful. The denominator in the calculation starts to 
become a small number which can cause the CTG% to vary widely. At this point, LCROSS simply 
managed the remaining work, assigned values/liens to that work, and then carefully managed the 
remaining reserve to a declining percent through project close. Using the CTG% chart (Fig. 7) was 
a very powerful way to understand where the project stood, financially, on a monthly basis. 
 
12. LCROSS PROGRAMMATIC SUMMARY 
 
The key to capabilities-driven, cost-capped missions like LCROSS is to keep it simple and to 
manage the risk equation. It is not about eliminating risk, which is very costly. It is about managing 
risk to a level commensurate with project programmatic constraints. LCROSS did this by making 
use of existing investments by the Agency, existing commercial hardware, and being sufficiently 
creative to see opportunities to buy-down risk.   
 
Ultimately, LCROSS succeeded because the individuals and organizations in the LCROSS team, 
walked a shared road on a mission to the Moon and worked together to make it succeed. Each party 
on this team had both mutual and self-interests for why they wanted to participate. The Agency 
wanted to show that there was an effective way to make use of excess launch capability and to work 
cheaply; NASA ARC wanted to show it was able to run small, fast-paced, lightweight missions; 
NG wanted to show that it could be nimble and carve out a new market for itself; and the 
commercial sector found an onramp to space and lunar applications which could propel their 
businesses into a new market. One of the great successes of LCROSS was aligning each the team 
member’s needs into a common purpose which benefited everyone in a win-win-win scenario. 
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